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Successfully controlling intrusive memories is harder when control must be
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ABSTRACT
After unpleasant events, people often experience intrusive memories that undermine their
peace of mind. In response, they often suppress these unwanted memories from awareness.
Such efforts may fail, however, when inhibitory control demands are high due to the need to
sustain control, or when fatigue compromises inhibitory capacity. Here we examined how
sustained inhibitory demand affected intrusive memories in the Think/No-Think paradigm. To
isolate intrusions, participants reported, trial-by-trial, whether their preceding attempt to
suppress retrieval had triggered retrieval of the memory they intended to suppress. Such
counter-intentional retrievals provide a laboratory model of the sort of involuntary retrieval
that may underlie intrusive memories. Using this method, we found that longer duration
trials increased the probability of an intrusion. Moreover, on later No-Think trials, control over
intrusions suddenly declined, with longer trial durations triggering more relapses of items
that had been previously been purged. Thus, the challenges of controlling retrieval appear to
cause a decline in control over time, due to a change in state, such as fatigue. These findings
raise the possibility that characteristics often true of people with psychiatric disorders – such
as compromised sleep, and increased demand on control – may contribute to difficulties in
suppressing intrusive memories.
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Memories of unpleasant life events sometimes intrude into
awareness. When this happens, people often seek to limit
awareness of the unwelcome reminding by stopping the
retrieval process. Evidence indicates that when people con-
sistently suppress retrieval in this manner, suppressed
items grow increasingly difficult to recall on later occasions
(for reviews, see Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Anderson &
Huddleston, 2012). Suppression not only reduces retention
on measures of voluntary retrieval, but also on involuntary
forms of retrieval such as the tendency for memories to
intrude into awareness in response to reminders (Benoit,
Hulbert, Huddleston, & Anderson, 2014; Levy & Anderson,
2012), free association (Hertel, Large, Stück, & Levy, 2012),
perceptual priming (Gagnepain, Henson, & Anderson,
2014; Kim & Yi, 2013), and implicit association tests (Hu,
Bergström, Bodenhausen, & Rosenfeld, 2015). These find-
ings suggest that people can recruit cognitive control
mechanisms to adaptively regulate intrusive memories.
Whether this type of memory adaptation is possible,
however, may hinge on other conditions that could com-
promise people’s efforts to implement suppression, such
as the total time over which the suppression of an
unwanted thought must be sustained. Indeed, most
people are familiar with how difficult it can be to sustain
attention for long periods of time and to avoid distraction,
particularly when the potential for distraction is significant.
In the present article, we examined these putative difficul-
ties in the context of memory control. In particular, we
examined whether counter-intentional retrievals of the
sort that could underlie naturally occurring intrusive mem-
ories grow more likely both with sustained challenge to
inhibitory control mechanisms, and with fatigue.
Involuntary memories and their control
The current investigation builds on two distinct, but comp-
lementary bodies of research concerning involuntary
memory on the one hand, and memory control, on the
other. Research on involuntary memory focuses on pro-
cesses that trigger memories to come to mind automati-
cally and reflexively, and whether they differ from
intentional retrieval. Involuntary memories have usually
been studied with diaries or questionnaires, in which par-
ticipants write down how and when autobiographical
memories were cued and what their content was (Bernt-
sen, 1996; Bradley, Moulin, & Kvavilashvli, 2013;
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Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004; Mace, 2004). Recently, invo-
luntary memories have been studied in controlled environ-
ments (Clark, Mackay, & Holmes, 2013). In one paradigm,
participants perform an undemanding vigilance task,
while they need to ignore short cue phrases (e.g., “crossing
the road”) on a screen (Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008).
Whenever an involuntary autobiographical memory came
to mind, participants paused the vigilance task and
reported their memory and what triggered it. After com-
pleting the vigilance task participants reported other
characteristics of the involuntary memories, such as
emotional valence and whether that memory was
general or specific. One week later, participants voluntarily
recalled autobiographical memories after seeing cue
phrases. In two experiments with this paradigm, Schlag-
man and Kvavilashvili (2008) showed that involuntary
memories were retrieved almost twice as quickly as volun-
tary memories and that these memories were more likely
to be specific. This suggests that involuntary memories
spring to mind quickly and without effort. However, how
people control involuntary memories when they arise has
remained largely unstudied in this research (e.g., for excep-
tions, see Brewin & Smart, 2005; Geraerts, Merckelbach,
Jelicic, & Smeets, 2006).
Complementing this work is a largely separate literature
examining how people voluntarily control memory.
Research on memory control tries to isolate mechanisms
by which people might prevent or interrupt the reflexive
retrieval of unwelcome memories when confronted with
reminders, as well as the consequences of engaging
those mechanisms for the retention of suppressed traces.
This form of memory control is often studied with the
Think/No-Think (TNT) paradigm (Anderson & Green,
2001), which examines people’s ability to suppress the epi-
sodic retrieval process to control intrusive memories. In the
TNT paradigm, people are repeatedly prompted with cues
to previously studied associates and are asked to either
retrieve the memory (hereinafter, Think trials), or to
instead stop its retrieval and exclude the unwanted
memory from awareness (hereinafter, No-Think trials). Par-
ticipants study a third set of items that are neither recalled
nor suppressed (hereinafter, baseline items). Afterwards,
memory for all pairs is tested by an unexpected memory
test to determine how retrieval suppression influenced
later retention of the excluded memories.
A large body of research shows that suppressing retrie-
val impairs later recall of No-Think items compared to base-
line items, an effect known as suppression-induced
forgetting (Anderson et al., 2004; Anderson & Green,
2001; Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Anderson & Huddle-
ston, 2012). Suppression-induced forgetting arises with
many types of stimuli, including word pairs, face–scene
pairs (Depue, Curran, & Banich, 2007), face–word pairs
(Hanslmayr, Leipold, Pastötter, & Bäuml, 2009), word–
object pairs (Gagnepain et al., 2014; Kim & Yi, 2013), and
pairs comprising words and nonsense shapes (Hart &
Schooler, 2012). Suppression-induced forgetting has even
been observed with autobiographical experiences
especially for event details (Hu et al., 2015; Noreen &
MacLeod, 2013; 2014; Stephens, Braid, & Hertel, 2013).
Importantly, suppression-induced forgetting occurs for
emotional materials, including negatively valenced words
and scenes (e.g., Catarino, Küpper, Werner-Seidler, Dalgle-
ish, & Anderson, 2015; Chen et al., 2012; Depue et al.,
2007; Hertel & McDaniel, 2010; Joormann, Hertel, Brozo-
vich, & Gotlib, 2005; Kim, Oh, Kim, Sim, & Lee, 2013;
Küpper, Benoit, Dalgleish, & Anderson, 2014; Lambert,
Good, & Kirk, 2010; LeMoult, Hertel, & Joormann, 2010;
Marzi, Regina, & Righi, 2014; Murray, Anderson, & Ken-
singer, 2015; Murray, Muscatell, & Kensinger, 2011; van
Schie, Geraerts, & Anderson, 2013). Evidence suggests
that suppression-induced forgetting can be produced in
two ways – either as an aftereffect of processes that
directly suppress retrieval, or by processes that promote
self-distraction, such as thought substitution (e.g., Benoit
& Anderson, 2012; Bergström, de Fockert, & Richardson-
Klavehn, 2009b; Hertel & Calcaterra, 2005; Hertel & McDa-
niel, 2010; Küpper et al., 2014). Overall, this body of work
on suppression-induced forgetting indicates that suppres-
sing unwanted thoughts about past events can be success-
ful, in contrast to findings observed with Wegner’s thought
suppression procedure (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000), with the
latter procedure suggesting that thought suppression can
be counterproductive (a point to which we return in the
Discussion).
Research on retrieval suppression assumes that present-
ing a cue triggers an automatic retrieval process that elicits
associated memories, unless effort is made to proactively
prevent or reactively interrupt this process. In essence,
this work assumes the form of automatic retrieval
process studied in research on involuntary memories,
without which there would be no need for control. More-
over, because research on retrieval suppression focuses
on how people suppress unwanted involuntary retrievals,
its mission is to address intrusive memories per se, a sub-
class of involuntary memories that are both unwanted
and perseverative (Kvavilashvili, 2014). Although the
assumption of involuntary retrieval in the TNT task is plaus-
ible, evidence for it has, until recently, been indirect. Next
we discuss direct evidence for intrusive retrievals, and
the control processes needed to counter them.
Measuring intrusions and their demands on
inhibitory control
To examine the assumption that involuntary retrievals arise
during retrieval suppression, Levy and Anderson intro-
duced a trial-by-trial judgment task during the TNT phase
of the TNT paradigm, asking participants’ to report their
phenomenal experience of whether the unwanted
memory intruded into awareness (Benoit et al., 2014; Hel-
lerstedt, Johansson, & Anderson, 2016; Levy & Anderson,
2012). This method was modelled after the trial-by-trial
introspection method developed in research on selective
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attention (Corallo, Sackur, Dehaene, & Sigman, 2008;
Sergent & Dehaene, 2004; Sergent, Baillet, & Dehaene,
2005). After every Think and No-Think trial, participants
judged the extent to which the target came to mind by
pressing one of three buttons associated with responses
“never”, “briefly”, and “often”. Using this procedure, Levy
and Anderson (2012) found that involuntary retrievals of
the unwanted memory occurred often; up to 60% of the
time on the first suppression attempt. With repeated sup-
pressions, however, participants reduced these retrievals
substantially (on average, down to 30%). Levy and Ander-
son also found that a steeper reduction in involuntary
retrievals over repeated suppressions (i.e., a steeper nega-
tive slope) predicted greater suppression-induced forget-
ting on the final test, suggesting that controlling
involuntary retrieval engages processes that trigger forget-
ting (see also Hellerstedt et al., 2016).
The foregoing findings suggest that online trial-by-trial
reports may provide a useful new method to isolate auto-
matic retrieval processes of key interest in research on invo-
luntary retrieval (Berntsen, 2010). Indeed, the tendency for
memories to enter awareness in direct opposition of partici-
pants’ intensive efforts to prevent a retrieval from occurring
provides a conceptually precise operational definition of
involuntary retrieval, given that such retrievals are counter-
intentional, a hallmark feature of automaticity. Unlike most
diary studies of involuntary retrieval, which only establish a
lack of clear intention to retrieve a memory (warranting
the phrase “non-intentional”), counter-intentional retrievals
justify the use of the phrase “involuntary”. Counter-inten-
tional retrievals may provide an informative laboratory
model of the retrieval processes that underlie intrusive
memories, which are involuntary retrievals that are both
unwanted and potentially disruptive (Kvavilashvili, 2014).
In line with their counter-intentional nature, we therefore
refer to the involuntary retrievals reported by our partici-
pants as “intrusions” (Levy & Anderson, 2012) that may be
relevant to clinical reports of intrusive memories (a point
to which we will return in the Discussion).
Several studies have used this intrusion reporting pro-
cedure to study the cognitive control demands present
during intrusive memories, and the brain systems that
are engaged. In general, retrieval suppression increases
activation in the (right) dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (here-
inafter, DLPFC; Anderson et al., 2004; Benoit & Anderson,
2012; Depue et al., 2007; Depue, Burgess, Willcutt, Ruzic,
& Banich, 2010; Gagnepain et al., 2014; Levy & Anderson,
2012), an area linked to inhibitory control over motor
responses (see Levy & Wagner, 2011 for a meta-analysis).
Attempting to stop retrieval in this manner reduces hippo-
campal activity, a finding often taken to reflect inhibitory
processes that interrupt retrieval activity that might other-
wise allow an intrusion to occur. Critically, Levy and Ander-
son (2012) found that during No-Think trials on which an
intrusion was experienced, hippocampal down-regulation
was especially pronounced, and this retrieval-related
down-regulation predicted later forgetting far better (r
= .7) than did hippocampal activity during No-Think trials
when participants did not experience an intrusion (r =
−.07). Benoit et al. (2014) further found that although sup-
pression generally engaged right DLPFC, trials with intru-
sions triggered elevated activity compared to trials
without intrusions, consistent with the possibility that cog-
nitive control is up-regulated. Recently, Hellerstedt et al.
(2016) found that during retrieval suppression, No-Think
trials that are accompanied by intrusions show evidence
that the unwanted item is briefly retrieved into working
memory and then is rapidly excluded (i.e., ERP indices of
working memory appear and then are quickly truncated);
in contrast No-Think trials that are not accompanied by
intrusions do not show ERP evidence of the unwanted
item entering working memory. Together, these findings
demonstrate that intrusion reports can isolate involuntary
retrieval in the TNT procedure, and that these intrusions
can be linked to objective neural indices of elevated cogni-
tive control.
If suppressing intrusions requires elevated cognitive
control, this process should be resource demanding. This
raises the possibility that diminished cognitive control
resources may trigger difficulty dealing with intrusions. Con-
sistent with this possibility, research on individual differ-
ences in inhibitory control ability supports the idea that
compromised cognitive control leads to difficulties in sup-
pressing intrusive memories. For example, individual differ-
ences in stop-signal reaction time (i.e., a measure of how
quickly a person can inhibit a motor action, indexing inhibi-
tory control) predict the ability to successfully forget
emotionally negative pictures (Depue et al., 2010). Moreover,
participants with major depressive disorder show reduced
suppression-induced forgetting compared to control partici-
pants (Joormann, Hertel, Lemoult, & Gotlib, 2009), as do par-
ticipants with anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress
disorder, and attention deficit disorder (ADD) (Catarino
et al., 2015; Depue et al., 2010; Marzi et al., 2014). Given
this evidence, task or state-dependent strains on cognitive
control might also be associated with increased incidence
of intrusive memories. We discuss these possibilities next.
Task and state-dependent challenges to controlling
memory intrusions
Task conditions and transitory states can place a burden on
cognitive control and may influence how effectively retrie-
val suppression can be engaged to control intrusive mem-
ories. For instance, the effort required to control episodic
retrieval may be especially pronounced when attention
must be sustained on a reminder for a longer time. Sus-
tained attention to a reminder provides more time for
the cue to drive retrieval of associated memories, increas-
ing the risk of involuntary retrieval. Moreover, sustained
attention to a reminder would require continuous vigilance
and engagement of inhibitory control mechanisms to
counter the tendency for cues to elicit a memory. Thus,
the need to sustain attention to reminders is a task state
MEMORY 3
variable that arguably places a heavier burden on inhibi-
tory control. Consistent with this possibility, Lee, Lee, and
Tsai (2007) observed significantly less suppression-
induced forgetting on long duration No-Think trials (5
seconds) than on short duration trials (3 seconds). Lee
et al. (2007) argued that sustaining inhibition over longer
durations increases the chances of cognitive control
failure and, consequently, intrusions. With more intrusions,
they argued, later recall could be enhanced, owing to
reinforced encoding of intruding traces. However, Lee
et al. had no way of measuring the frequency of intrusions
to verify their assumption of increased inhibitory demand.
In the present study, we therefore used Lee et al.’s manipu-
lation of trial duration, which we adjusted to include short
(2.5 seconds) and long (5 seconds) durations for both Think
and No-Think trials, and combined this with the intrusion
report method. Based on Lee et al.’s claim, we hypoth-
esised that longer trial durations would trigger greater
demands on inhibitory control, yielding a higher prob-
ability of intrusions on long trials compared to short
trials. This greater intrusion frequency may arise from
increased input to retrieval stemming from sustained
viewing of the cue, or instead from lapses in the task set
governing inhibitory control, due to fatigue, either of
which would indicate greater demands on control.
To test this hypothesis, we used the intrusion report
method during the TNT phase to determine whether par-
ticipants report significantly more intrusions during
longer trials than during shorter ones. If sustaining
control over time is demanding, we should also find indi-
cations of decreased efficacy of control over a longer
time scale spanning the entire 35-minute duration of the
TNT phase. This putative waning efficacy may be detect-
able in the patterns of intrusions over the eight suppres-
sion attempts on an item. Prior work has established a
monotonic decline in reported intrusions over repeated
suppression attempts during the TNT phase, possibly
reflecting the tendency for prior inhibitions to accumulate
in their impact on suppressed traces (Benoit et al., 2014;
Hellerstedt et al., 2016; Levy & Anderson, 2012). This
accumulation of inhibition may mask, however, a waning
efficacy of the control process owing to fatigue. To test
this possibility, we examined fine-grained item-by-item,
transition patterns in memory control success that arise
across consecutive suppression attempts on the same
item. For example, by looking at the intrusion histories of
individual items we can examine how well a participant’s
efforts to suppress retrieval of a particular item on one
trial then carry forward to the next trial with that same
item. This enables us to look at the conditions that lead
to successful suppression (i.e., when an intrusion on trial
N is followed by successful control on trial N + 1 with that
item, hereinafter referred to as new successes), and also
conditions that increase the chances of memory control
relapses (i.e., when successful control on trial N is followed
later by failed control on trial N + 1 with that particular
item). If sustaining control over a much longer time scale
leads to fatigue, two patterns should emerge. First,
although new successes should increase over early rep-
etitions, they should, as fatigue sets in, ultimately decline,
indicating a reduced ability to down-regulate intrusions
from one repetition to the next. Second, an initial period
in which participants can reduce control relapses over rep-
etitions should be followed by an increase in relapses
towards the end of the TNT phase, as participants grow
fatigued. This pattern would reflect diminishing ability to
suppress intrusions in a way that has a lasting impact on
later trials. Finally, we would expect relapses to be gener-
ally more likely during longer duration trials, owing to
the greater demand those trials place on inhibitory control.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from Erasmus University Rotter-
dam undergraduate psychology classes via the Erasmus
Psychology Study Pool. To be eligible for the study, partici-
pants had to be between 18 and 35 years of age and fluent
in Dutch. Additionally, they reported never to have been
diagnosed with ADD or Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Dis-
order (ADHD) or to be colour blind. Forty-four undergradu-
ates participated for course credit. Data from three
participants were excluded because of scoring errors
made by the experimenter during the experimental pro-
cedure; one participant was excluded because of failing
to reach learning criterion, leaving a final sample of 40
(M= 20.28 years, SD = 1.87; 25 females and 15 males).
Materials and design
The stimuli consisted of 60 randomly combined neutral
Dutch cue-target word pairs (e.g., BARREL – NUN), which
were equally divided over five word groups. The cues and
targets were drawn from three previous studies (Anderson
et al., 2004; Anderson & Green, 2001; van Schie et al., 2013),
and were also, in part, newly constructed. For newly con-
structed pairs, we selected emotionally neutral words
from a large dataset of Dutch words by Moors et al.
(2013). We used relatively short noun words with a
maximum length of 10 letters and 3 syllables. Selected
words typically are concrete noun words (e.g., Stomach,
Desk). For as far as possible we tried to select words that
did not have a strong association with other words in the
stimulus set. Such an association was limited to the
targets and independent probes only. For each pair’s
target we selected an associated word from the association
database from the University of Leuven (www.kuleuven.be/
semlab) to serve as an independent probe (see Table 1 in
the Appendix for all pairs’ cue, target, and independent
probes). These independent probes provide secondary
cues for the target words (e.g., Cloister N____ for Nun).
These cues enable us, on the final test, to test all targets
twice, once with the studied cue, once with an independent
cue. Though not crucial to the purpose of the current study,
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testing targets in two ways provided converging evidence
for the generality of suppression-induced forgetting
across cues, supporting the involvement of inhibition in
controlling retrieval (Anderson & Green, 2001). Importantly,
there was no evidence for the five experimental word
groups to differ statistically on ratings (taken from Moors
et al., 2013) of valence, arousal, power, and age of acqui-
sition for cue, target, and independent probe; nor did
they differ on word length, word frequency, and association
strength between target and independent probe. Eighteen
additional cue-target pairs served as fillers. Filler pairs were
used to train participants on the TNT task (see description of
the TNT phase in The TNT Procedure below).
Word groups were rotated through conditions (Base-
line, Think short, Think long, No-Think short, and No-
Think long), so that each word group was presented
equally often in each condition.
TNT procedure
The experiment was run with E-prime 2.0 (Psychology Soft-
ware Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). During the procedure, the
experimenter was present to provide instructions for
each phase and verbal encouragement when necessary.
Vocal responses were scored out of the participant’s sight.
General instructions
At the outset of the experiment, participants were told that
they were about to participate in an experiment on atten-
tion, and that their ability to ignore distraction would be
assessed. They were told that they would learn pairs of
words to be used in the attention test, and that they
would need to ignore associations in memory. No refer-
ence was made to a final memory test for the words at
any point in the procedure, to ensure that participants
took the retrieval suppression task seriously and did not
covertly rehearse suppression words during the TNT phase.
Learning phase
The total set of 60 critical pairs was learned in three subsets
of 20. Each subset of 20 critical items had an equal rep-
resentation of items from each counterbalancing set. In
the first set, 26 pairs (20 critical plus 6 filler) were presented
one by one in white font on a black background in the
middle of a screen for 4000 ms with a 400 ms intertrial
interval (ITI). Pseudo-randomised test-feedback cycles fol-
lowed in which participants were instructed to verbally
recall each target when presented with its cue. Cues disap-
peared after 3500 ms or upon verbal response. The correct
target was displayed in blue for 1000 ms followed by a
400 ms ITI regardless of the participant’s answer. If at
least 50% of the experimental target words were recalled
correctly, participants progressed immediately to the
second subset of words; if not, the test was repeated
once. Regardless of the percentage correct on set rep-
etition, the participant continued to the second subset of
26 words, for which the same procedure ensued. After
this, they continued to the third and final subset. The
phase concluded with an integrated test (without any feed-
back) for pairs from all three sets. Participants repeated this
phase if they did not reach the 50% cut-off. If participants
did not reach the cut-off on their second test, they were
excluded from further participation.
TNT phase
On each trial, a fixation cross appeared for 400 ms followed
by a cue presented for either 2500 ms for short trials or
5000 ms for long trials. For Think cues, presented in
green, participants were asked to retrieve its target silently;
for No-Think trials, presented in red, they received direct
suppression instructions, asking them to suppress retrieval
of the target without substituting something else for the
target. Cue words from Baseline items, though learned in
the study phase, did not appear in this phase, and thus pro-
vided a baseline estimate of memory for pairs, given that
neither suppression nor retrieval took place during the
TNT phase. After each cue word, a rating scale appeared
on the screen and participants had 1500 ms to report the
extent to which the target entered awareness during that
trial; the scale included values of “never”, “briefly”, and
“often”, and participants indicated their response by press-
ing a corresponding button with their dominant hand.
Trials were separated by a 400 ms ITI.
The TNT phase consisted of four blocks separated by 45-
second breaks. Each block contained 96 cues, representing
12 cues in each Instruction × Duration combination, each
repeated twice. No more than three cues with the same
instruction or duration were displayed consecutively.
Across all blocks, each cue was repeated eight times.
Before the critical TNT phase, participants performed two
practice blocks with 24 filler trials: 12 No-Think and 12
Think trials. The first practice block was conducted
without the rating scale for either Think or No-think items;
the second practice block added the ratings for all trials.
Final test phase
After the TNT phase, participants’ memory was assessed
unexpectedly using two types of tests, the order of which
was counterbalanced across participants. In the same
probe test, participants were presented with the pair’s
cue (e.g., BARREL – _____) and in the independent probe
test, with a word associated to the target along with a
letter stem (CLOISTER – N____). All items were assessed
in the same probe and in the independent probe test. Par-
ticipants were given up to 10 seconds to recall the target.
Trials were separated by a 400 ms ITI. A short practice test
on fillers preceded these tests.
Post-experimental questionnaire
After the test, participants filled out a post-experimental
questionnaire rating their use of different strategies during
No-Think trials to verify that participants followed our
direct suppression instructions. All strategies were rated on
a 5-point scale ranging from 0 never to 4 always indicating
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use of each strategy and whether they intentionally did not
follow experimental instructions, and how awake or sleepy
they felt before they started the experiment. We further
measured intentional non-compliance with No-Think
instructions to ensure that all participants had genuinely
tried to exclude memories from awareness (Hertel & Calca-
terra, 2005). Intentional non-compliance was measured
with three questions: (a) When I saw the red cue word, I
quickly checked to see if I remembered the target word,
(b) After a red cue word went off the screen, I checked to
see if I still remembered the target word, and (c) When I
saw a red cue word, I thought about the target word that
went with it in an effort to improve my memory for that
word pair. These questions were rated on a 5-point scale
ranging from 0 never to 4 very frequently.
Results
All analyses are based only on pairs for which participants
recalled the target on the final learning test (Anderson
et al., 2004). Overall, learning performance on this test
was sufficiently high: 72.44% (SE = 1.66). To retain power
in all subsequent analyses, slight violations of sphericity
were corrected with either Greenhouse–Geisser (.70≥ ε
< .75) or Huynh–Feldt corrections (ε≥ .75). In case of
severe violations (.70 < ε) a multivariate test statistic
(Pillai-Bartlett trace; V ) is reported. In all analyses counter-
balancing condition was included as a between-subjects
factor to account for item effects, and nonsignificant
results of this factor (or its interactions) are not reported.
Final recall performance
Though intrusion reports from the TNT phase were our
primary interest, we replicated prior findings concerning
suppression-induced forgetting on the final test. Replicat-
ing past work, suppression affected final recall, as evi-
denced by poorer recall of target words in the suppress
conditions overall (No-Think short M = .83, SE = .013; No-
Think long M = .841, SE = .013) compared to recall of
target words from Baseline pairs (M = .861, SE = .011), F(1,
35) = 4.337, p = .045, h2p = .11. There was no reliable differ-
ence in recall between short duration and long duration
suppression conditions, F(1, 35) = .378, p = .543, nor were
there interactions with test type (i.e., same probe or inde-
pendent probe test), Fs < 1.3. None of the foregoing sup-
pression-induced forgetting effects (or comparisons of
short vs long No-Think) interacted with test-order counter-
balancing (all ps > .25).
Replicating key patterns in control over intrusions
during the TNT task
Our main hypothesis was that longer trial durations would
be accompanied by a greater number of intrusions than
would shorter trial durations, as measured by our trial-by-
trial intrusion reports collected during the TNT phase.
However, we first assessed whether we replicated past
work on reports of conscious awareness in the TNT phase
(e.g., Levy & Anderson, 2012), by conducting a 2 (condition:
Think/No-Think) × 8 (repetition) ANOVA, with short and
long duration trials averaged per condition. If participants
reported that a memory came to mind “briefly”, or
“often” during a No-Think trial, we considered this an intru-
sion; if they reported that a memory “never” came to mind
during the trial, we considered this a non-intrusion. Partici-
pants also made the same judgments after Think trials, in
which case the awareness of the memory was the
desired goal, so this would not be considered an “intrusion”
per se. But the reports in the two conditions can be com-
pared nonetheless, to quantify variation in mnemonic
awareness as a function of task goals.
Directly comparing reports of mnemonic awareness
across the Think and No-Think conditions, we observed
an exceptionally robust main effect, F(1, 35) = 212.839, p
< .001, hp2 = .859, demonstrating that people experienced
target memories entering awareness far less often during
No-Think trials (M = .47, SE = .034) than during Think trials
(M = .98, SE = .005). Thus, according to participants’
phenomenal reports, they showed a remarkable overall
ability to voluntarily control episodic retrieval. Neverthe-
less, intrusions still were experienced on a significant pro-
portion (approximately half of the time) of No-Think trials
(see Figure 1, left panel).
Reports of intrusions declined substantially across sup-
pression repetitions. This pattern is reflected in a robust Rep-
etition × Condition interaction, V = .602, F(7, 29) = 6.255, p
< .001, h2p = .602. This interaction was followed up by one
ANOVA for Think trials and one for No-Think trials. These
showed that reports of awareness did not vary over rep-
etitions for Think trials V = .142, F(7, 29) = .689, p = .681,
but were reduced substantially from the first No-Think rep-
etition (M = .62, SE = .034) to the eighth one (M = .43, SE
= .041), V = .599, F(7, 29) = 6.196, p < .001, h2p = .599. Thus,
participants grew increasingly effective at suppressing
intrusions of No-Think items as repetitions progressed,
and remained highly effective at bringing Think trials to
mind across all repetitions (see Figure 1, right panel).
These results strongly confirm findings from prior neuroi-
maging studies using this trial-by-trial intrusion scale
(Benoit et al., 2014; Hellerstedt et al., 2016; Levy & Anderson,
2012). Increasing success at controlling intrusions may
reflect some combination of the accumulation of inhibition
on suppressed traces over repetitions, improved skill at
stopping retrieval in general, and a passive decline in the
accessibility of No-Think items over time, though prior
work clearly indicates a significant contribution of inhibitory
control (e.g., Benoit et al., 2014; Levy & Anderson, 2012).
Sustaining inhibitory control continuously is
demanding
To test whether confronting a reminder during No-Think
trials for longer periods of time is more demanding than
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confronting a reminder for shorter periods of time, we
included trial duration (short vs. long) as a within-subjects
factor in our analysis of intrusion reports, and conducted a
2 (duration: Short/Long) × 8 (repetition) ANOVA. This analy-
sis revealed a highly reliable difference in the frequency of
intrusions between short (M = .44, SE = .035) and long dur-
ation (M = .50, SE = .035) No-Think trials, F(1, 35) = 22.856, p
< .001, h2p = .395. Thus, longer trial durations likely imposed
a greater burden on inhibitory control, as reflected in the
increased probability of intrusions, an effect that did not
interact with repetition, F < 1. This trial duration effect
also was apparent when intrusion reports for No-Think
trials were broken down into “brief” and “often” responses.
Brief intrusions arose more often during long (M = .46, SE
= .03) than during short trials (M = .42, SE = .03), t(39) =
3.015, p = .005. Similarly, participants reported that an
intrusion “often” came to mind with greater frequency
during long (M = .04, SE = .009) than during short trials
(M = .02, SE = .004), t(39) = 2.339, p = .025. Consistent with
our hypothesis concerning trial durations, “never”
responses were mirrored to “briefly” and “often” responses;
there were more “never” responses on short trials (M = .56,
SE = .03) compared to long trials (M = .50, SE = .03), t(39) =
4.149, p < .001.
Further evidence for greater demand on control pro-
cesses can be plainly seen in the cumulative intrusion func-
tions for our duration conditions. In these functions, the
number of intrusions on each repetition is the sum of intru-
sions reported during that repetition and all preceding rep-
etitions. A 2 (duration: Short/Long) × 8 (repetition) ANOVA
showed that on long duration trials there were more intru-
sions overall, F(1, 35) = 14.393, p = .001, h2p = .291, and a sig-
nificant Duration × Repetition interaction showed that the
number of intrusions accumulated more quickly over No-
Think repetitions for long duration compared to short
duration trials, V = .529, F(7, 29) = 4.658, p = .001, h2p = .529
(see Figure 2). Moreover, although people often were
able to successfully control intrusions (i.e., make intrusions
of an item stop entirely for all of its remaining No-Think
trials), it took significantly more trials to achieve this goal
for long duration No-Think trials. To quantify this, we
computed, for each item, the average number of No-
Think repetitions until the last intrusion was experienced.
For longer duration trials, the average serial position of
the final intrusion occurred later during the TNT phase
(M = 5.95, SE = .24), than it did for short duration trials
(M = 5.32, SE = .28), t(39) = 3.754, p = .001. Thus, increasing
trial duration made it harder to succeed quickly at suppres-
sion, likely reflecting the increased demand placed on
inhibitory control mechanisms.
Next, we investigated the nature of the relationship
between time and the probability of an intrusion occurring.
It is conceivable that if one intrusion is experienced within
a short duration No-Think trial (i.e., 2.5 seconds), then two
intrusions should be experienced within a long duration
No-Think trial (i.e., 5 seconds). This would be classified as
Figure 1. Proportion of trials during which the memory came to mind displayed for No-Think trials and Think trials (left panel), and the proportion of intru-
sions over repetitions in the TNT Phase (right panel) for No-Think and Think trials. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
Figure 2. Cumulative intrusion frequency per repetition for short and long
duration No-Think trials, which reflects the sum of reported intrusions on
each repetition and all preceding repetitions. Error bars represent standard
errors of the mean.
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an additive relationship, wherein intrusions increase uni-
formly with the number of seconds (see Figure 3, line
with circular markers). Alternatively, the relationship may
be superadditive; in this case, the number of intrusions
experienced over time is higher than what would be
expected based on an additive relationship. Long duration
No-Think trials would show more than twice the number of
intrusions compared to short duration trials, perhaps
reflecting increasing within-trial fatigue. A final possibility
is an underadditive relationship, wherein with increasing
trial duration, intrusions may still increase, but less than
would be expected based on a simple additive relation-
ship. Figure 3 illustrates an exploratory analysis we con-
ducted illustrating that an underadditive relationship best
characterises our data. The proportion of intrusions for
long duration trials is much less than twice the amount
observed during short trials, and the cumulative recall
function increases for long trials, but not at a rate that is
double the slope of the short trials.
To further characterise the relationship between time
and an intrusion occurring, we looked at the number of
intrusions per second for short and long duration trials.
We estimated the number of intrusions per second by
totalling the number of intrusions reported for each item
across its eight repetitions, and then dividing by the total
number of seconds the participant spent suppressing
that item (e.g., 8 suppression attempts × 2.5 seconds per
attempt = 20 seconds; or × 5 seconds per attempt = 40
seconds). Remarkably, the number of intrusions per
second was much lower in the long (M = .10, SE = .007)
than in the short trials (M = .17, SE = .01), t(39) = 9.067, p
< .001. To verify this difference was not the result of an
overall difference in the total time suppressing unwanted
memories in the short (20 seconds of total suppression
time) and long trials (40 seconds of total suppression
time), we restricted our comparison to the first 20
seconds within the short and long conditions. Thus, for
the short condition, the first 20 seconds would cover all 8
repetitions (2.5 seconds × 8 repetitions), whereas for the
long condition, it would cover the first 4 repetitions (5
seconds × 4 repetitions). In addition, to illustrate how the
number of intrusions per unit time changed with rep-
etitions, we compared the development of intrusion rates
across the first 20 seconds in the long duration condition
and the first 20 seconds in the short duration condition.
To do this, we divided the first 20 seconds into 4 equal
size bins of 5 seconds each. For the long duration con-
dition, these bins were simply the first four 5 suppression
trials, each of which was 5 seconds long. For the short dur-
ation condition, these 5-second bins were each composed
by aggregating over two consecutive 2.5-second long trials
on a given item. For each of these 5-second bins, we then
summed the intrusions observed within it. This enables us
to plot intrusion rate (intrusions per 5-second bin) across
four time bins matched for duration in the short and
long conditions. A 2 (duration: Short/Long) × 4 (repetition
interval) ANOVA showed that even with this more precise
matching of total time, the average number of reported
intrusions per 5 second bin in long condition (M = .57, SE
= .07 or.11 intrusions per second) remained lower than in
the short condition (M = .87, SE = .034 or.17 intrusions per
second), F(1, 35) = 44.561, p < .001, h2p = .56. Interestingly,
a significant Duration × Repetition interaction showed
that though intrusions per each 5 second intervals in the
short condition decreased with repetition, they remained
higher at the fourth repetition, compared to long condition
intervals, F(3, 105) = 10.46, p < .001, h2p = .23 (see Figure 4).
Finally, we considered the possibility that the foregoing
conclusions about underadditivity and intrusion rate might
have arisen because we failed to adequately consider trials
that contained multiple intrusions, which occurred slightly
more often on long duration than short duration trials (4%
of the trials instead of 2%). Specifically, the foregoing ana-
lyses do not distinguish between trials where participants
report a single brief intrusion (the subject responded
“briefly” on the intrusion scale) and trials where partici-
pants report having experienced more than one intrusion
(the subject responded “frequently”), because, in either
case, a participant was simply classified as having an intru-
sion on that trial. It is possible that if we gave credit for
trials with more than one intrusion, the conclusions
might differ. To address this, we recomputed all analyses
using a graded scale (0 for non-intrusions, 1, for a brief
intrusion, 2 for frequent intrusions). All of the foregoing
analyses turned out the same, with differences between
conditions in fact growing slightly larger and more reliable,
not less (intrusions per second in the long versus short con-
ditions, M = .11 and.18 respectively, p < .001; in the analysis
using only the first 20 seconds,124 versus 184, respectively
(.62 vs. 92 intrusions per 5-second bin), p < .001, h2p = .58).
The similarity in the analyses reflects the fact that multi-
intrusion trials were rare (only 3% of reports) and thus
Figure 3. Additive function for cumulative intrusion frequency, which is
plotted based on the average number of cumulative intrusions in short dur-
ation No-Think trials times two. It represents a uniform increase of intrusions
with time. The position of the long duration No-Think cumulative intrusions
relative to the additive function, shows that the relationship between time
and the probability of an intrusion occurring is underadditive (i.e., the No-
Think duration line lies below the additive function). Error bars represent
standard errors of the mean.
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could not exert much influence on the data. Thus, our con-
clusions about underadditivity and intrusion rates seem
unlikely to derive from this analysis choice. Nevertheless,
although “frequent” responses were a very small part of
the data, it would be desirable, in future studies, to quantify
the number of intrusions on such trials more precisely to
yield a more accurate measurement.
Repeated inhibitory control is demanding
If applying inhibitory control is effortful, the quality of that
effort may decline as blocks progress, particularly in the
later blocks and under more strenuous conditions. To
test this we calculated a transition score between every
two sequential repetitions of each item (e.g., the second
suppression attempt of item X, and the third attempt on
X, irrespective of other items that may have intervened
between those repetitions of X), and determined in what
proportion of transitions an intrusion was followed by a
non-intrusion (i.e., new successes), and a non-intrusion
was followed an intrusion (i.e., relapses). Successes give
us a measure of how well one’s efforts to suppress retrieval
of a particular item carry forward to later trials with that
item; this may indicate persisting aftereffects of suppres-
sion on the item in question. Relapses, on the other
hand, suggest that one’s prior successes at controlling
awareness did not produce lasting effects on the sup-
pressed item, and possibly signal a lapse in applying
control mechanisms to that item.1
For successes, there was an effect for Repetition which
shows that the probability of a new success (i.e., transitions
from intrusions to non-intrusions) increased reliably
over repetitions at first, but then the pattern reverses in
later blocks displaying a clear quadratic relationship,
χ2(35) = 89.191, p < .001 (see Figure 5, left panel). There
was no reliable difference in the probability of new suc-
cesses between short- and long duration conditions,
χ2(35) =−4.719, p > .05, nor was there an interaction of
No-Think trial duration with repetition, χ2(210) =−6.787,
p > .05. Taken together, these findings indicate that the
probability of achieving a new successful control declined
suddenly towards the end of the TNT task, consistent with
the possibility that participants were growing fatigued
during the final repetitions. Alternatively, the drop in new
successes may reflect greater difficulty in suppressing the
remaining intrusions, which may be the most persistent
and demanding items.
In contrast to new Successes, Relapses did show sensi-
tivity to trial duration; relapses were significantly more fre-
quent in the long duration condition (M = .376, SE = .029)
compared to the short duration condition (M = .309, SE
= .031), χ2(35) = 63.55, p = .002 (see Figure 5, right panel).
There was no main effect of repetition, χ2(108) =−4.137,
p > .05 or an interaction of duration with repetition,
χ2(210) =−19.126, p > .05. This suggests that when trial
duration was longer, it was more difficult for suppression
to induce a persisting impact that carried forward to the
next suppression trial for a given item.
We also sought to relate the foregoing patterns to par-
ticipants’ subjective reports of alertness. Post-experimen-
tally, we asked participants to rate, on a 5-point scale,
their alertness at the outset of the experiment. Ratings on
this scale were uniformly high (M = 4.18), so there unfortu-
nately was little variability in initial alertness that could be
related to subsequent intrusions. Thus, participants having
lower alertness at the outset of the study did not reliably
predict increased relapse probability (when examined
overall, r =−.16; when focusing on the second half of TNT
phase, r =−.26), nor did it predict decreased new successes
(overall, r = .01, second half, r =−.05). However, the three
participants who reported unusually compromised alertness
(scores of 1 or 2) did have a far higher relapse probability
(M = .63) than the remaining subjects with relatively
normal alertness (M = .37), especially when considering the
second half of the TNT phase (Low = .68, Remainder = .31).
Compliance
All (100%) of participants reported that they often or always
used strategies consistent with direct suppression instruc-
tions, such as staring intently at the cue word, repeating
the cue word silently, or letting their mind go blank in
response to the cue word. Strategies consistent with
thought substitution, such as generating a word, thought
or sound in response to the No-Think cue, were never
(0%) reported as being used often or always. A minority
of participants (45%) reported they rarely or sometimes
used a thought substitution strategy. Thus, participants
largely complied with our instructions to directly suppress
retrieval of No-Think targets. Moreover, non-compliance
with No-Think instructions was low; the majority of partici-
pants indicated never or rarely trying to intentionally violate
No-Think instructions, respectively 87.5%, 95%, and 97.5%
for our three compliance questions (see Methods).
Figure 4. Average number of intrusions per 5-second interval for the short
and long duration No-Think conditions. Each 5-second interval for the short
duration No-Think condition is the sum of two repetition intervals that were
2.5 seconds originally. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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Discussion
The findings of the current study support the conclusion
that control over involuntary retrieval is more challenging
if it must be sustained for longer periods of time. To charac-
terise how challenging it was for participants to control
retrieval, we used a trial-by-trial intrusion report method
developed in prior work to document participants’
phenomenal experience of intrusions during retrieval sup-
pression. These reports have been used successfully to
identify distinctive hemodynamic and electrophysiological
signatures of inhibitory control over memory (Benoit et al.,
2014; Hellerstedt et al., 2016; Levy & Anderson, 2012). Using
intrusion reports, we tested two main hypotheses. First, if
needing to continuously suppress episodic retrieval in
response to a prepotent reminder for longer intervals
taxes inhibitory control processes to a greater extent,
more intrusions should be observed during long duration
trials (5 seconds) than short duration trials (2.5 seconds).
Increased intrusion frequency during longer trials may be
produced either by more sustained input to the retrieval
process owing to attention to the cue, or to lapses in
task set maintenance with longer intervals, either of
which would make stopping retrieval more challenging.
The results provide clear support for this duration effect:
participants reported experiencing intrusions with a
greater probability during longer suppression trials than
during shorter ones. This pattern arises primarily from an
increase in the number of trials on which a single intrusion
occurred, rather than an increase in the number of intru-
sions per trial, though a relatively modest increase in
multi-intrusion trials also was evident in the data. The
increase in the probability of an intrusion occurring was
present across all suppression repetitions. These findings
demonstrate that being exposed to reminders for longer
durations increases the challenge posed to controlling
retrieval. This increased challenge is also reflected in the
fact that, on average, it took participants 5.95 trials to
fully control all intrusions of an item for long trials, but
only 5.32 repetitions for short duration trials.
Beyond the effects of trial duration, we also hypoth-
esised that there would be a gradual deterioration of the
ability to control intrusions when control must be main-
tained over very long intervals. In a typical TNT task, partici-
pants engage in multiple blocks of memory control that,
taken together, may last between 30 and 60 minutes,
and we have previously noted that participants can
become fatigued after such intervals (Anderson & Huddle-
ston, 2012). If sustaining control in this manner is challen-
ging, evidence for increasing burden may be evident in
intrusion reports, which may reveal participants’ declining
ability to control retrieval towards the end of our TNT
task. We predicted that although this pattern would be
seen in changes in overall intrusion frequency, it would
be particularly striking in our sequential dependency ana-
lyses of the intrusion data. The data partially support
these predictions. On the one hand, we found the pre-
dicted deterioration in new successes (cases in which an
intrusion on trial N is followed by a non-intrusion on trial
N+1) towards the end of the TNT phase, (see Figure 5);
on the other hand, the predicted quadratic trend in
relapses (cases in which a non-intrusion on trial N is fol-
lowed by an intrusion on trial N+1), while numerically
present for long duration trials (see Figure 5), was not
reliable. Long duration trials were, nevertheless associated
with more relapses than were short duration trials, consist-
ent with the notion that they impose greater demands on
inhibitory control.
One interpretation of these cross-block changes in the
success of inhibitory control is that participants suffered
from increasing fatigue after 35 minutes of performing a
demanding retrieval suppression task. This possibility is
broadly consistent with the sensitivity of executive func-
tioning to sleep deprivation, which shows that sleep depri-
vation increases the difficulty in inhibiting inappropriate
responses (Chuah, Venkatraman, Dinges, & Chee, 2006;
Drummond, Paulus, & Tapert, 2006). For example, a
recent study using a Go-No Go task showed that mental
fatigue indeed gives rise to delayed motor inhibition
(Kato, Endo, & Kizuka, 2009). Because there is overlap
Figure 5. Proportion of new successes (left panel) and relapses (right panel) per repetition-to-repetition transition for short and long duration No-Think trials.
New successes reflect the transition from an intrusion to non-intrusion, while relapses represent the transition from a non-intrusion to an intrusion. Pooled
means and standard errors of the mean are presented.
10 K. VAN SCHIE AND M. C. ANDERSON
between the systems involved in motor and memory inhi-
bition (Anderson & Weaver, 2009; Depue, Orr, Smolker,
Naaz, & Banich, 2015), mental fatigue may affect memory
inhibition in a similar fashion. However, although fatigue
provides a plausible explanation for these cross-block pat-
terns, the present data cannot distinguish fatigue from
other factors that could also have changed over blocks,
any of which may account for poor task performance,
including changes in mood, and, perceived novelty of
the task (i.e., boredom). There is evidence indicating, for
example, that the sort of cognitive conflict that triggers
cognitive control is an aversive state (Inzlicht, Bartholow,
& Hirsh, 2015) that people seek to avoid or minimise
such cognitive effort (Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick,
2010). Thus, it is possible that engaging in inhibitory
control over a sustained interval may induce negative
mood. Future studies should seek to distinguish these
accounts, perhaps through a detailed characterisation of
fatigue, affect, and interest throughout the task. Our
current measurement of alertness was restricted to alert-
ness at the outset of the task, and (fortunately or unfortu-
nately) revealed nearly all participants to feel fully alert.
Despite the clear increase in reported probability of
intrusions for longer duration trials, a separate question
remains whether control is more efficiently exercised if it
is done over shorter or longer intervals. One way to quan-
tify the efficiency of control is to compare the rate of
intrusions per second across the two conditions. Interest-
ingly, by this measure, longer duration trials were more
efficient, in that they are associated with significantly
fewer intrusions per second (.10) than were shorter dur-
ation trials (.17). This conclusion held when we focused
on the first 20 seconds of suppression for each condition
(note that there the short duration condition involved a
total of only 20 seconds – i.e., 2.5 seconds across 8
trials) and compared “time bins” of the same size (i.e., 5
second bins – which is a single trial in the long duration
condition, and two trials in the short duration condition).
Thus, the true probability of intrusions as a function of
time suppressing was much lower for long duration
trials (.11 intrusions per second, or .57 per 5 seconds)
than it was for shorter duration trials (.17 intrusions per
second, or .87 intrusions per 5 seconds), suggesting that
participants got better results from their efforts. Indeed,
as can be seen in Figure 4, the increased intrusion rate
for shorter duration trials is particularly pronounced
during early bins, and shrinks rapidly with repeated
effort. In contrast, for longer duration trials, the intrusion
rate is uniformly lower, and appears relatively constant
over time bins, with little evidence for improvement in
rate over repetitions. This increased efficiency with
longer trial durations is likely to explain the pattern of
underadditivity we observed in our data: we found that
5-second trials were characterised by far fewer intrusions
than would be expected if these trials were equivalent
to two 2.5-second trials, and inhibition efficacy was strictly
a function of the time devoted to the task.
Why would control over intrusions be more efficient if it
is applied for longer intervals? One likely explanation is that
when performing two 2.5-second trials versus one 5-
second trial, participants need to reinstate the control
operation twice in the former instance. Transitioning into
a No-Think trial surely involves switching of task sets
(Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994), and, until the suppression
task set is successfully implemented by the participant on
a given trial, they run the risk of being reminded of the
associated memory. Put differently, the race between two
parallel processes – the involuntary retrieval process on
the one hand, and the controlled implementation of the
inhibition task set on the other – may be lost by the inhi-
bition process some fraction of the time, yielding an intru-
sion. Thus, when comparing the same total amount of time
(5 seconds), there are two occasions on which the task set
must be implemented in the short duration condition and
only one in the longer duration condition. Long duration
trials enable participants to simply sustain an already
implemented control operation and devote more time to
application of control and less to its initial implementation.
If this interpretation is correct, then the steeper decline in
the rate of intrusions per second during short duration
trials over consecutive time bins suggests (relative to that
observed during long duration trials; see Figure 4), that
short duration trials, while less efficient, are more effective
in driving some form of durable improvement. This could,
in principle reflect more effective buildup of inhibition on
suppressed traces during short duration trials.
The current study demonstrates the importance of trial
duration in experiments on motivated forgetting. In pre-
vious experiments there has been considerable between-
experiment variation in No-Think trial duration; anywhere
between 2 seconds (Bergström, de Fockert, & Richardson-
Klavehn, 2009a) and 6 seconds (Marx, Marshall, & Castro,
2008), or even 8 seconds (Wang, Cao, Zhu, Cai, & Wu,
2015). This may have inadvertently affected the number
of experienced intrusions and, with it, the size of suppres-
sion-induced forgetting. Indeed our effects of trial duration
are consistent with the interpretations offered by Lee et al.
(2007), who speculated that long trial durations during the
TNT task are associated with a greater burden on inhibitory
control. In support of this idea, Lee et al. (2007) observed
less suppression-induced forgetting on long duration (5
seconds) trials compared to short duration (3 seconds)
trials. Because the current study added a trial-by-trial intru-
sion report measurement, we were able to show that long
duration trials were indeed more likely to elicit the need for
control; these trials were accompanied by more intrusions,
a faster accumulation of intrusions over repetitions, and a
larger number of trials until control over intrusions fully
succeeded. Unlike Lee et al. (2007), however, we did not
find a clear distinction between short and long duration
No-Think trials in suppression-induced forgetting, as
assessed with the final recall test. This finding suggests
that participants’ reports of intrusions provide a more sen-
sitive measure for assessing the effects of the suppression
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process, compared to a voluntary final recall test. It is poss-
ible, for example, that control processes engaged during
explicit recall on the final test may undo the effects of sup-
pression (especially on partially suppressed items) in a way
that does not arise when accessibility of No-Think items is
assessed by the propensity for an item to involuntarily
intrude.
Our evidence that “relapses” in controlling intrusive
memories are more likely with longer trial durations may
shed light on another frequently used paradigm investi-
gating the nature and controllability of intrusive thoughts.
Studies using the “white bear” paradigm have found that
suppressing thoughts about a white bear continuously
for 5 minutes often paradoxically increases the presence
of the suppressed thoughts as measured by a similar self-
report process to the one used here (Wegner, Schneider,
Carter, & White, 1987). Work with this paradigm has
suggested that suppression is not only an ineffective
method of mental control, but may also be a counterpro-
ductive one (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). Although there
are a variety of important ways in which the TNT and
White Bear paradigms differ (see Anderson & Huddleston,
2012 for a discussion with hypotheses), the current exper-
iment suggests that a key difference may lie in the total
amount of time participants must continuously suppress.
Our data suggest that purging unwanted thoughts of
white bears may bemore successful when purging attempts
are implemented in short spikes of activity. “White bear”
experiments may yield a counterproductive pattern partially
as a result of a heavy burden placed on inhibitory control
arising from the need to suppress an unwanted thought
for a very long period of time. The greater effectiveness of
suppression attempts on shorter distributed trials may be
related to the benefits of spaced practice over massed prac-
tice (Donovan & Radosevich, 1999).
To the extent that our findings provide evidence that
sustained control (whether on a trial or session level) can
be fatiguing, they may have implications for psychopathol-
ogy. It has been put forward that inhibitory deficits may be
the reason that intrusive memories or thoughts can be
observed in a wide-range of psychopathologies, such as
PTSD (flashbacks), obsessive–compulsive disorder (obses-
sions), or depression (rumination) (e.g., Anderson & Hansl-
mayr, 2014; Catarino et al., 2015; Fawcett et al., 2015; Hertel
& Gerstle, 2003; Joormann et al., 2009; Marzi et al., 2014).
Given the prevalence of sleep disorders in psychiatric con-
ditions (Wulff, Gatti, Wettstein, & Foster, 2010), fatigue is
especially important to identify, because fatigued patients
may be less likely to engage inhibitory control effectively.
As a result they will experience more intrusive memories
than those who are well rested, perhaps further deteriorat-
ing their psychiatric condition.
The intrusion report method used here identifies and
quantifies the frequency of counter-intentional retrievals
that are triggered by strong reminders to an unwanted
memory. Because these retrievals occur despite partici-
pants’ efforts to stop them, and because they recur
whenever cues are presented, we have argued that the
processes triggered may be related to those underlying
intrusive memories in psychopathology. Consistent with
this view, recent discussions of how intrusive memories
differ from involuntary retrievals more broadly have
emphasised qualities such as their perseverative nature
and how they arise, despite being unwanted (Kvavilashvili,
2014). However, clinically relevant intrusive memories also
are emotionally intense and stressful, and can be highly
disruptive to the individual experiencing them, unlike the
intrusions studied here. These differences are clearly impor-
tant and may signify fundamentally different retrieval mech-
anisms from the ones studied here. Our view, however, is
that the emotional nature of naturally occurring intrusive
memories and their personal significance likely function to
substantially increase the frequency with which people
“self-cue” the internal triggers that lead to the intrusions,
via their emotional state or thoughts, but that, once cued,
the involuntary retrieval processes are fundamentally
similar to the ones at work here. However, regardless of
one’s theoretical assumptions, the current paradigm pro-
vides a useful tool for comparing the intrusive qualities of
a wide variety of memories – whether neutrally, negatively,
or positively valenced, or whether autobiographical or lab-
oratory-based – and testing the extent to which the cogni-
tive and neural mechanisms triggered are similar or distinct.
In conclusion, the current findings provide evidence sup-
porting the view that intrusive memories can be controlled,
but that it is harder to do so when control must be sustained.
These findings suggest that the need to sustain attention to
reminders indeed places a heavier burden on inhibitory
control. Our novel approach of analysing sequential depen-
dencies between intrusion repetitions confirmed this and
additionally showed that needing to sustain control over
very long intervals decreases successful suppression of
unwanted memories. The finding that sustained engage-
ment compromises inhibitory control is also especially rel-
evant for understanding intrusive thoughts and memories
in psychopathologies, particularly to the extent that such
deficits arise from fatigue. Indeed, fatigue could, in principle,
be a key factor contributing to failed memory control in psy-
chiatric conditions. In future research, phenomenal reports
of intrusions of the sort used here may provide a helpful
method for studying, in-depth, how intrusive memories
are controlled in different psychiatric conditions. Indeed,
the particular sequential dependency patterns operationa-
lised here (e.g., relapse probability) may provide new
measures that could predict vulnerability to intrusive
symptomatology, above and beyond individual variation in
suppression-induced forgetting (Levy & Anderson, 2008).
Note
1. We used multiple imputation in SPSS (Version 22) for transition
scores in successes and relapses, because 5.63% of the data
were missing. Little’s MCAR test shows no identifiable pattern
exists for the missing data, χ2(583) = 596.58, p = .339. Next, 25
12 K. VAN SCHIE AND M. C. ANDERSON
datasets were imputed (automatic imputation method).
Regular ANOVAs for main or interaction effects were performed
on the imputed datasets and all 25 F-values were pooled using
the R package miceadds, which produces a χ2 statistic per
effect to test for significance (Robitzsch, Grund, Henke, &
Robitzsch, 2016).
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Table A1. Cue, target, and independent probe for the words in the five experimental groups and words in the filler group.
Group Cue Target Independent probe
1 Gelei (Jelly) Ruw (Crude) Grof (Coarse)
Jurk (Dress) Vaandel (Banner) Vlag (Flag)
Vork (Fork) Paard (Horse) Ruiter (Horseman)
Molen (Mill) Vin (Fin) Vis (Fish)
Zuilen (Columns) Viool (Violin) Snaar (Snare)
Azië (Asia) Rivier (River) Stroom (Stream)
Sproet (Freckle) Boodschap (Message) SMS (Text message)
Koning (King) Heuvel (Hill) Berg (Mountain)
Hooi (Hay) Perron (Platform) Trein (Train)
Gordijn (Curtain) Poster (Poster) Muur (Wall)
Radio (Radio) Sneeuw (Snow) Winter (Winter)
Stoel (Chair) Vuur (Fire) Vlam (Flame)
2 Spook (Ghost) Neef (Nephew) Tante (Aunt)
Bont (Fur) Fornuis (Stove) Koken (To cook)
Helm (Helmet) Cassette (Cassette) Video (Video)
Standbeeld (Statue) Verf (Paint) Kwast (Brush)
Kin (Chin) Gras (Gras) Tuin (Garden)
Vat (Barrel) Non (Nun) Klooster (Cloister)
Tomaat (Tomato) Vest (Vest) Knopen (Buttons)
Uur (Hour) Cent (Cent) Munt (Coin)
Blouse (Blouse) Zwaard (Sword) Ridder (Knight)
Smaragd (Emerald) Ballet (Ballet) Dans (Dance)
Museum (Museum) Kluis (Safe) Code (Code)
Korst (Crust) Leraar (Teacher) Leerling (Pupil)
3 Bezem (Broom) Pop (Doll) Speelgoed (Toys)
Kaak (Jaw) Noord (North) Zuid (South)
Tolk (Interpreter) Cirkel (Circle) Kring (Circle)
Nonchalant (Nonchalant) Boek (Book) Lezen (To read)
Raam (Window) Maag (Stomach) Orgaan (Organ)
Uil (Owl) Kantoor (Office) Bureau (Desk)
Patent (Patent) Ei (Egg) Dooier (Yolk)
Krant (Newspaper) Planeet (Planet) Aarde (Earth)
Clown (Clown) Lens (Lens) Bril (Glasses)
Gewoonte (Habit) Toren (Tower) Kerk (Church)
Gang (Corridor) Ketel (Kettle) Stoom (Steam)
Machine (Machine) Deugd (Virtue) Geduld (Patience)
4 Strik (Bow) Laars (Boot) Schoen (Shoe)
Dorp (Village) Olijf (Olive) Olie (Oil)
Hoek (Corner) Zalf (Ointment) Tube (Tube)
Spieren (Muscles) Dwerg (Dwarf) Klein (Small)
Dun (Thin) Meter (Meter) Lengtemaat (Measure of Length)
Item (Item) Slapen (To sleep) Droom (Dream)
Vlecht (Braid) Valk (Falcon) Roofvogel (Bird of prey)
Kwart (Quart) Arm (Arm) Elleboog (Elbow)
Nederig (Humble) Lamp (Lamp) Licht (Light)
Voetbal (Soccer) Tiener (Teenager) Jong (Young)
Stad (City) Fluit (Flute) Orkest (Orchestra)
Walnoot (Wallnut) Blauw (Blue) Kleur (Colour)
5 Ivoor (Ivory) Gedicht (Poem) Rijm (Rhyme)
Room (Cream) Citroen (Lemon) Zuur (Sour)
Laan (Lane) Kast (Cabinet) Lade (Drawer)
Hardloper (Runner) Nacht (Night) Donker (Dark)
Rum (Rum) Reparatie (Repair) Garage (Garage)
Hek (Fence) Mos (Moss) Bos (Forest)
Sprong (Leap) Huis (House) Baksteen (Brick)
School (School) Papier (Paper) Pen (Pen)
Schaduw (Shadow) Wortel (Carrot) Konijn (Rabbit)
Schort (Apron) Vakantie (Holiday) Zon (Sun)





Group Cue Target Independent probe
Priester (Priest) Schip (Ship) Kapitein (Captain)
Filler Kinderkamer (Nursery) Mand (Basket) Riet (Reed)
Globe (Sphere) Klok (Clock) Tijd (Time)
Werktuig (Utensil) Vinger (Finger) Duim (Thumb)
Gereedschap (Tool) Schrijver (Writer) Auteur (Author)
Paraplu (Umbrella) Schaar (Scissors) Knippen (To cut)
Golfer (Golfer) Taxi (Taxi) Chauffeur (Driver)
Lipgloss (Lipgloss) Deur (Door)
Gebruik (Custom) Vierkant (Square)
Laken (Sheets) Dokter (Doctor)
Onderdeel (Part) Kom (Bowl)
Apparaat (Appliance) Koeien (Cows)
Spray (Spray) Snoer (Cord)
Formulier (Form) Tijm (Thyme)
Verrekijker (Binoculars) Kauwgom (Chewing gum)
Salade (Salad) Koffie (Coffee)
Wolk (Cloud) Straat (Street)
Reclame (Commercial) Brug (Bridge)
Badkamer (Bathroom) IJzer (Iron)
Note: The original Dutch words are presented accompanied by English translations.
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